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A quantum key distribution protocol with classical Bob based on polarization entangled photon pairs is pre-
sented. It approximates a single photon and exploited the inherent randomness of quantum measurements to
attain highly secure keys and high efficiency of the transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is a way to transform information so that it
is unintelligible and therefore unless to those who are not
meant to have access to it. Thus far, it is trusted that the only
proven unconditionally secure crypto-system is the one-time-
pad scheme. To employ this scheme, therefore, the two distant
communicating parties must have a secure method to share a
key that is as long as the message to be encrypted. However,
it is not an easy task to share the secret keys between the two
parties prior to the communication because they cannnot send
a secret key by an open channel to the public. Fortunately
Bennett-Brassard (BB84) [1] showed how to exploit the prop-
erties of quantum mechanics for cryptographic purposes, in-
dependently rediscovered by Ekert (E91) [2] a few years later,
which was the beginning of quantum key distribution (QKD)
and have been theoretically proven secure [3] when both par-
ties are quantum, Up to now, many quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocols have already been proposed [4–7].
What is possible when only one party (Alice) is quantum,
yet the other (Bob) has only classical capabilities? Recently,
several ”semi-quantum” key distribution protocols (SQKD)
were proposed [8–10]. Boyer et al. [8] suggested the idea of
semiquantum key distribution using four quantum states. For
convenience, we call such a protocol BKM2007. Zou et al.
[10] derived its simplification that requires only one quantum
state, ZQLWL2009 for short. These protocols give an answer
to how much ”quantum” a protocol needs to be in order to
achieve a significant advantage over all classical protocols.
The conventional setting when both parties are quantum
is as follow: Alice and Bob have labs that are perfectly se-
cure, both of them can perform any quantum operations, and
they use qubits for their quantum communication on a quan-
tum channel and also have a classical authenticated channel
which can be heard, but cannot be tampered with by the ad-
versary. For SQKD protocol [8], a quantum channel travels
from Alice’s lab to the outside world and back to her lab. Bob
can access a segment of the channel, and whenever a qubit
∗ sunzhiwei1986@gmail.com
† Duruigang@yahoo.com.cn
‡ issldy@mail.sysu.edu.cn
passes through that segment Bob can either let it go undis-
turbed or (1) measure the qubit in the computational basis
{|1〉, |0〉} which is also called ”classical” basis; (2) prepare a
(fresh) qubit in the classical basis, and send it. Bob is called
classical Bob if he is limited to performing only operations (1)
and (2) or doing nothing and could never obtain any quantum
superposition of the computational basis states. If all the par-
ties are classical, they would always be working with qubits in
the classical basis which would then make the resulting pro-
tocol be equivalent to an old-fashion classical protocol, and
therefore, the operations themselves shall here be considered
classical. So this kind of protocol is termed ”QKD with clas-
sical Bob” or ”Semi-quantum key distribution”.
The SQKD protocols [8–10] have been proved being com-
pletely robust which is an important step in studying security.
Robustness of a protocol means that any attempt of an eaves-
dropper to obtain information on the INFO string (the defini-
tion of INFO string defined in Ref. [8]: before Alice and Bob
perform the ECC step) necessarily induces some error which
is detectable by the legitimate users. In particular, Boyer et al.
[8] divided robustness into three classes: completely robust,
partly robust, and completely nonrobust. A protocol is said to
be completely robust if nonzero information acquired by Eve
on the INFO string implies nonzero probability that the legit-
imate participants find errors on the bits tested by the proto-
col. A protocol is said to be completely nonrobust if Eve can
gain the INFO string without inducing any error on the bits
tested by the protocol. A protocol is said to be partly robust if
Eve can acquire some limited information on the INFO string
without inducing any error on the bits tested by the protocol.
Partly robust protocols could still be secure, but completely
nonrobust protocols are automaticaly proven insecure [8].
Both BKM2007 and ZQLWL2009 have a common prob-
lem: the sources of the photons are attenuated laser pulses
which have a nonzero probability to contain two or more
photons, leaving such systems subject to the so-called beam
splitter attack which has been discussed in Ref. [11]. Us-
ing entangled photon pairs as generated by parametric down-
conversion allows us to approximate a conditional single pho-
ton source [12] with a high bit rate [13], and yet a very low
probability for producing two pairs simultaneously. And our
protocol is more efficient than BKM2007 and as efficient as
ZQLWL2009.
2In section II, we present an efficient SQKD protocol us-
ing Bell state which exploiting the features of entangled pho-
ton pairs for generating highly secure keys. In section III, we
prove our protocol being completely robust. Finally, we give
a brief discussion and conclusion.
II. SCHEME FOR QKD WITH CLASSICAL BOB
To define our protocol we first introduce the four polar-
ization entangled states |φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) and |ψ±〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉), which are created directly using parametric
down-conversion by the method described in Ref. [12]. |φ±〉
and |ψ±〉 are also known as Bell or EPR state. A SQKD proto-
col using Bell state to construct is described in the following.
(1) Quantum Alice and classical Bob agree on that the Bell
state |φ+〉 and |ψ+〉 represent one bit classical information 0
and 1, respectively.
(2) Alice prepares an ordered N = 4n(1 + δ) EPR pairs
in the state |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉), where integer n is the
desired length of the INFO string and δ > 0 is a fixed pa-
rameter. And Alice divides the ordered EPR pairs into two
partner-photon sequences [P1(H), P2(H), P3(H), · · · , PN(H)]
and [P1(T ), P2(T ), P3(T ), · · · , PN(T )]. Here Pi(H) and
Pi(T ) are the two photons correlated with each other in
the ith (i = 1, 2, · · · ,N) EPR photon pair. We call
[P1(H), P2(H), P3(H), · · · , PN(H)] the home sequence or sim-
ply the H-sequence; the another sequence is called travel se-
quence or the T-sequence for short.
(3) For each qubit in the H-sequence, Alice randomly se-
lects whether to apply the Pauli operation X = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0|
or do nothing. We notice that by performing the Pauli opera-
tion X, it transforms the state |φ+〉 into |ψ+〉. Then she stores
the H-sequence and sends the T-sequence to Bob through the
quantum channel.
(4) For each qubit arriving, Bob chooses randomly either
to reflect it (CTRL) or to measure it in the computational ba-
sis and resend it in the same state he found (to SIFT it). He
records the results of the measurement which is completely
secret to any other person other than Bob himself. Qubits are
sent one by one, i.e., Alice sends a qubit only after receiving
the previous one and Bob resends a qubit immediately after
receiving it [8].
(5) Alice uses an N-qubit register to save all photons com-
ing back from Bob. Then she tells Bob through a classical
channel that she has received the photon sequence.
(6) After hearing from Alice, Bob announces which qubits
he chose to CTRL. It is expected that for approximately N2
qbits of T-sequence, Bob chooses randomly to reflect them.
We refer to these qbits as TCTRL, and the corresponding qubits
in the H-sequence is called HCTRL. We refer to the qubits Bob
chose to SIFT as TS IFT , and the correlated partner-photon is
HS IFT . They abort the protocol if the number of TS IFT bits is
less than 2n; this happens with exponentially small probabil-
ity.
TABLE I. Relations of the initial state, measurement results of HS IFT
, TS IFT and Raw key.
Initial state Measurement result of HS IFT Measurement result of TS IFT Raw key
|φ+〉 0 0 0
|ψ+〉 0 1 1
|φ+〉 1 1 0
|ψ+〉 1 0 1
(8) Alice checks the error rate on the TCTRL in the following
way. She makes Bell measurement on the CTRL qubit (qubit
in the TCTRL) and corresponding home qubit (qubit in the H-
sequence) and compares the measurement result and the cor-
responding initial EPR state, if they are inequal, some errors
may happen. If the error rate on the TCTRL is higher than some
predefined threshold PCTRL, the protocol aborts, otherwise the
next step is executed.
(9) Alice measures particles of HS IFT and particles of TS IFT
in the computational basis, and chooses ar random n HS IFT
to be TEST qbits. She publishes which are the chosen qbits.
Bob publishes the measurement results (of TS IFT ) correspond-
ing to the TEST qubits. Alice compares the results of these
measurements. If they are indeed perfectly correlated, Alice
and Bob can certain that there is no eavesdropping; otherwise,
they abort the protocol.
(10) Alice announces the measurement results of the re-
maining HS IFT . Bob obtains the raw key by comparing the
measurement results of HS IFT and TS IFT , which is shown
clearly in TABLE. I. Alice and Bob select the first n raw key
to be used as INFO string.
(11) Then Alice announces error correction code (ECC) and
privacy amplification (PA); she and Bob use them to extract
the m-bit final key from the n-bit INFO string.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Now, we discuss the security of our protocol. Firstly, when
Alice sends T -sequence to Bob, an eavesdropper Eve who
wants to get the information on the initial states, may inter-
cept this particle and resend a fake particle instead according
to her measurement result. Because the state of particle in
T -sequence is
ρTi = TrHi (ρHiTi ) =
1
2
(|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|) = I
2
, (1)
where i = 1, 2, 3, · · · ,N. This state has no dependence upon
the initial entangled states, and thus any measurements per-
forms by Eve will contain no information about the initial
states, thus preventing Eve from knowing the secret key. And
we show that if Eve resends a fake particle to Bob, for exam-
ple, this fake particle is in the state |ϕE〉 = c|0〉 + d|1〉, where
|c|2 + |d|2 = 1. If Bob chooses to reflect it. The state of the
3fake particle and the home particle is
ρHE =
1
2
(|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|)
⊗(c2|0〉〈0| + cd∗|0〉〈1| + c∗d|1〉〈0| + d2|1〉〈1|). (2)
When Alice and Bob make eavesdrop checking, Alice makes a
Bell measurement on this fake particle and home particle and
she will get any one of four Bell states with equal probability
1
4 . So the error rate introduced by Eve is
3
4 .
Furthermore, the most general attack of Eve can be de-
scribed by a unitary operator UE , which causes one or both
of the EPR particles to interact coherently with an auxiliary
quantum system available to her for subsequent measurements
of her own. The most general global state before Bob decides
whether to SIFT or CTRL is of the form
|Φ〉 = |00〉HT |A〉E + |01〉HT |B〉E
+|10〉HT |C〉E + |11〉HT |D〉E , (3)
where |A〉, |B〉, |C〉 and |D〉 are Eve’s choices for states of her
system, which she does not even have to decide how to mea-
sure until after Alice and Bob have gone public.
Suppose the initial state Alice prepares is |φ+〉. On the
qubit coming back, Eve applies the unitary UE ; if Bob
sifted, the global state before Eve applies UE is |00〉HT |A〉E +
|11〉HT |D〉E . Once Eve has applied UE , it must be such
that UE |00〉HT |A〉E = |00〉HT |E0〉E else the SIFT can de-
tect an error, and similarly UE |11〉HT |D〉E = |11〉HT |E1〉E .
Due to the linearity of quantum mechanics, if Bob re-
flects (CTRL), the resulting final state must be UE |Φ〉 =
|00〉HT |E0〉E + |11〉HT |E1〉E . As UE |Φ〉 = |φ+〉HT (|E0〉E +
|E1〉E) + |φ−〉HT (|E0〉E − |E1〉E) and |φ−〉HT to have probabil-
ity 0 of being measured by Alice, |E0〉E = |E1〉E must hold.
Similarly, if the initial states is |ψ+〉. On the qubit coming
back, Eve applies the unitary UE ; if Bob sifted, the global
state before Eve applies UE is |01〉HT |B〉E + |10〉HT |C〉E . Once
Eve has applied UE , it must be such that UE |01〉HT |B〉E =
|01〉HT |E1〉E else the SIFT can detect an error, and similarly
UE |10〉HT |C〉E = |10〉HT |E0〉E . Due to the linearity of quantum
mechanics, if Bob reflects (CTRL), the resulting final state
must be UE |Φ〉 = |10〉HT |E0〉E + |01〉HT |E1〉E . As UE |Φ〉 =
|ψ+〉HT (|E1〉E + |E0〉E) + |ψ−〉HT (|E1〉E − |E0〉E) and |ψ−〉HT to
have probability 0 of being measured by Alice, |E0〉E = |E1〉E
must hold.
So the final state is UE |Φ〉 = |φ+〉HT |E0〉E if the initial
state is |φ+〉HT and UE |Φ〉 = |ψ+〉HT |E0〉E if the initial state
is |ψ+〉HT . Thus the only faked source sure of passing Alice’s
and Bob’s checking is one in which Eve’s system is entirely
uncorrelated with the EPR particles, so that a subsequent mea-
surement on it tells her no information.
As Eve may gain a certain amount of information without
being detected, for example, Eve measures the SIFT bits in
computational basis. So to reduce Eve’s information to an
arbitrarily low value, some privacy amplification protocols are
needed. After privacy amplification Alice and Bob would end
up with a shared random sequence.
TABLE II. Efficiency of BKM2007, ZQLWL2009 and our protocol.
qt bs bt Efficiency
BKM2007 8n n 8n 116
ZQLWL2009 4n n 4n 18
Our protocol 4n n 4n 18
IV. CONCLUSION
Our protocol is efficient in that it uses all Bell states in dis-
tributing the key except those, approximately half of the Bell
states, chosen for checking eavesdropping. This is different
from the BKM2007 where only 34 of the particles are used as
keys. We now study the efficiency of the protocol. We con-
sider the definition given in Ref. [14],
η =
bs
qt + bt
, (4)
where bs is the length of the INFO string, qt is the number of
transmitted qubits on the quantum channel, and bt is the num-
ber of transmitted bits on the classical channel. Here the clas-
sical bits used for eavesdrop checking have been neglected.
And the efficiency of our protocol (approximate 18 ) is higher
than that of the BKM2007 protocol (about 116 ) and not lower
than that of the ZQLWL2009 protocol (about 18 ), which is
shown in TABLE. II. From a theoretical point of view the
scheme provides an interesting and new extension of Boyer et
al.’s original idea using Bell state, and give an efficient and se-
cure protocol; but from a practical point of view it may be dif-
ficult to realize because building a reliable quantum memory
is still a major research goal in experimental quantum physics
[15–17] and current technology allowing storage time is still
limited.
In conclusion, we present a SQKD protocol using Bell state
that is secure against beam splitter attack and more efficient
than BKM2007 and as efficient as ZQLWL2009.
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